Este trabajo describe el concepto de reflexión en la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl y en la hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, especialmente en sus trabajos metodológicos y de fundamentación de sus respectivas filosofías. La atención está puesta principalmente en las semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas nociones de reflexión. Con ello se pretende conducir al lector hacia la pregunta que interroga por el sentido de la actividad reflexiva, entendida como capacidad de descubrir y analizar las propias operaciones subjetivas implicadas en la constitución (...) de la vida y del mundo. En último término se pretende revisar el alcance de ambas filosofías y la posibilidad de una conjunción entre ambas. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar la cuestión de las habitualidades en la fenomenología de Husserl para pensar la génesis de la reflexión en nuestro mundo actual. En un primer momento, y principalmente a partir de libros primero y segundo de las Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica, se revisarán el concepto de yo en Husserl en dos de sus dimensiones principa-les: el yo como polo idéntico de las vivencias y el yo como substrato de las (...) habitualidades. Después realizaremos un análisis sobre la génesis de las habitualidades y su repercusión en el concepto de yo puro. Por último se ejemplificará esta cuestión en el caso de la reflexión, especialmente en el caso de una posible génesis negativa de la reflexión en forma de reflexi-vidad ritual o hiperreflexividad. Con ello se quiere establecer una línea de conexión entre la subjetividad trascendental y nuestro mundo concreto, así como entre la fenomenología y la psicopatología.The aim of this work is to present the question regarding to the habitualities in Husserl´s Phenomenology in order to think the genesis of reflection in our present world. In a first stage, and specially acording to the first and second book of Ideas [...] the concept of "I" will be considered in its two main dimen-sions: the I as identical pole of the lived-experiences and the "I" as substratum of habitualities. Afterwards, I will perfom an analysis on the genesis of the habitualities and its consecuences in the in the concept of pure I. In the last part this question will be ejemplied though the case of reflection in the form of a Ritual Reflectivity or Hypereflectivity. Whitin I would like to suggest the link conection be-tween the trascendental subjectivity and our concrete world, and the phenomenology and psychopathology relationship as well. (shrink)

This work presents a discussion about the application of the Kolmogorov; López-Ruiz, Mancini, and Calbet ; and Shiner, Davison, and Landsberg complexity measures to a common situation in physics described by the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. The first idea about complexity measure started in computer science and was proposed by Kolmogorov, calculated similarly to the informational entropy. Kolmogorov measure when applied to natural phenomena, presents higher values associated with disorder and lower to order. However, it is considered that high complexity must be (...) associated to intermediate states between order and disorder. Consequently, LMC and SDL measures were defined and used in attempts to model natural phenomena but with the inconvenience of being defined for discrete probability distributions defined over finite intervals. Here, adapting the definitions to a continuous variable, the three measures are applied to the known Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution describing thermal neutron velocity in a power reactor, allowing extension of complexity measures to a continuous physical situation and giving possible discussions about the phenomenon. (shrink)

This work is a generalization of the López-Ruiz, Mancini, and Calbet (LMC) and Shiner, Davison, and Landsberg (SDL) complexity measures, considering that the state of a system or process is represented by a continuous temporal series of a dynamical variable. As the two complexity measures are based on the calculation of informational entropy, an equivalent information source is defined by using partitions of the dynamical variable range. During the time intervals, the information associated with the measured dynamical variable is the (...) seed to calculate instantaneous LMC and SDL measures. To show how the methodology works generating indicators, two examples, one concerning meteorological data and the other concerning economic data, are presented and discussed. (shrink)

Thinking about space is thinking about spatial things. The table is on the carpet; hence the carpet is under the table. The vase is in the box; hence the box is not in the vase. But what does it mean for an object to be somewhere? How are objects tied to the space they occupy? This book is concerned with these and other fundamental issues in the philosophy of spatial representation. Our starting point is an analysis of the interplay between (...) mereology (the study of part/whole relations), topology (the study of spatial continuity and compactness), and the theory of spatial location proper. This leads to a unified framework for spatial representation understood quite broadly as a theory of the representation of spatial entities. The framework is then tested against some classical metaphysical questions such as: Are parts essential to their wholes? Is spatial colocation a sufficient criterion of identity? What (if anything) distinguishes material objects from events and other spatial entities? The concluding chapters deal with applications to topics as diverse as the logical analysis of movement and the semantics of maps. (shrink)

A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

Holes are a good example of the sort of entity that down-to-earth philosophers would be inclined to expel from their ontological inventory. In this work we argue instead in favor of their existence and explore the consequences of this liberality—odd as they might appear. We examine the ontology of holes, their geometry, their part-whole relations, their identity and their causal role, the ways we perceive them. We distinguish three basic kinds of holes: blind hollows, perforating tunnels, and internal cavities, treating (...) these uniformly as immaterial bodies. We develop a morphology of holes, focusing on the way a hole can be filled, and then look at the main properties of the resulting conceptual framework: holes are parasitic upon the surfaces of their hosts; holes can move, fuse into each other, split; they can be born, develop, and die. Finally, we examine how some morphological features of holes are represented in perception, including the conditions whereby we have the impression that we see, feel, or even hear a hole. The book has over 150 pictures and is completed by a formal appendix, a section with puzzles and exercises, and a extensive annotated bibliography. (shrink)

A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.

Philosophical questions about events lie at the crossing of several disciplines, from metaphysics and logic to philosophy of language, action theory, the philosophy of space and time.

Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.

This chapter analyzes the concept of an event and of event representation as an umbrella notion. It provides an overview of different ways events have been dealt with in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. This variety of positions has been construed in part as the result of different descriptive and explanatory projects. It is argued that various types of notions — common-sense, theoretically revised, scientific, and internalist psychological — be kept apart.

Ordinary reasoning about space—we argue—is first and foremost reasoning about things or events located in space. Accordingly, any theory concerned with the construction of a general model of our spatial competence must be grounded on a general account of the sort of entities that may enter into the scope of the theory. Moreover, on the methodological side the emphasis on spatial entities (as opposed to purely geometrical items such as points or regions) calls for a reexamination of the conceptual categories (...) required for this task. Building on material presented in an earlier paper, in this work we offer some examples of what this amounts to, of the difficulties involved, and of the main directions along which spatial theories should be developed so as to combine formal sophistication with some affinity with common sense. (shrink)

Classically, truth and falsehood are opposite, and so are logical truth and logical falsehood. In this paper we imagine a situation in which the opposition is so pervasive in the language we use as to threaten the very possibility of telling truth from falsehood. The example exploits a suggestion of Ramsey’s to the effect that negation can be expressed simply by writing the negated sentence upside down. The difference between ‘p’ and ‘~~p’ disappears, the principle of double negation becomes trivial, (...) and the truth/falsehood opposition is up for grabs. Our moral is that this indeterminacy undermines the idea of inferential role semantics. (shrink)

This is a position article summarizing our approach to the philosophy of space and spatial representation. Our concern is mostly methodological: above all, we argue that a number of philosophical puzzles that arise in this field—puzzles concerning the nature of spatial entities, their material and mereological constitution, their relationship with the space that they occupy—stem from a confusion between semantic issues and true metaphysical concerns.

We comment on the last chapter of Henrich where the author offers a ‘key’ to Hegel’s Logic focusing on the problem of the passage from self-reference to determination in the beginning of the Logic. We argue that what he offers as a ‘key’ is actually a reduction of Hegel to the logic of understanding from the point of view of an autonomous Ego; consequently, he excludes dialectics. Contrarily, we present Hegel’s own solution, eliciting the remark where he shows that the (...) proposition “Being and Nothing are the same” negates itself insofar as it is uttered and reflected on the Other’s understanding. We conjecture that this remark offers a privileged point from which to consider the connection Hegel-Lacan, provided we recognize the Absolute in Hegel as the big Other in Lacan. We suggest that the dialectical identity of identity and difference is actually an operation in the Agora and that the Hegel-Marx-Lacan theory can be properly denominated dialectical materialism. We also offer an answer to Žižek’s question of how a “neutral medium of designation” can emerge within a “life-world practice” or out of a “universe of matter. (shrink)

A brief study of Saul Steinberg’s works on shadows and reflections, and of the seemingly paradoxical world that emerges from such works.

This major bibliography offers a comprehensive overview of the recent literature on the nature of events and the place they occupy in our conceptual scheme. The subject has received extensive consideration in the philosophical debate over the last few decades, with ramifications reaching far into the domains of allied disciplines such as linguistics and the cognitive sciences. The starting point for this work is Hans Reichenbach's pioneering contribution on the logical form of action sentences, and the broad scope includes entries (...) from the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of space, time, and causation, and situation theory. Approximately 1,850 entries from more than 900 authors are listed in alphabetical/chronological order by author, and most entries are annotated. This excellent work also includes Subject, Name, and Second and Subsequent Authors indexes. (shrink)

An imaginary dialogue between Andrea Bonomi and Gonzalo Pirobutirro (the main character of Gadda’s novel La cognizione del dolore) aiming to challenge Bonomi’s tenet that a work of fiction defines a domain of objects which is closed with respect to the actual world.

A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.

Italian translation of "Holes and Other Superficialities" (1994).

Rewarding regulation involves pursuing the complex goal of bringing labor protection and firms’ economic performance together. A central element in achieving such goals refers to how regulatory bureaucracies operate. This paper examines the organizational structures, processes, and internal dynamics that allow regulatory bureaucracies to innovate and meet such developmental challenges. It reviews well-established interpretations about state bureaucracies that have emphasized either hierarchical structures and control processes or discretion and disperse individual behaviors. In addition, it suggests alternative analytical paths for combining (...) flexibility and control by examining the relational processes and dynamics within bureaucracies. The analysis of the Brazilian Labor Inspectorate, based on qualitative data and extensive fieldwork, and of other empirical examples from the literature, indicates that internal tensions and conflicts instigate a process of technical vigilance between members of the same bureaucracy, inducing innovation and responsible uses of discretion. (shrink)

A philosophical dialogue on the functioning, the limits, and the paradoxes of our electoral practices, dealing with such basic questions as: What is a vote? How do we count votes? And do votes really count?

This issue of The Monist is devoted to the metaphysics of lesser kinds, which is to say those kinds of entity that are not generally recognized as occupying a prominent position in the categorial structure of the world. Why bother? We offer two sorts of reason. The first is methodological. In mathematics, it is common practice to study certain functions (for instance) by considering limit cases: What if x = 0? What if x is larger than any assigned value? Physics, (...) too, often studies the (idealized) initial and boundary conditions of a given system: What would happen in the case of a perfect sphere, or a perfectly black body? In the cognitive sciences, research often thrives on the analysis of cognitive errors, perceptual illusions, brain pathologies. Also in logic one can learn a lot by studying special, anomalous scenarios such as those exhibited by the paradoxes: it is unlikely that we actually find ourselves in a soritical context, or in a liar-like situation, but the fact that we might—or simply the fact that we can conceive of such a possibility—is important enough to deserve careful consideration. In short, the odd, the unfamiliar, the extra-ordinary, the limit cases are perfectly at home in scientific and more broadly intellectual discourse at various levels, where they can be fruitfully engaged in a sophisticated way (witness the existence of specific confining and managing strategies for dealing with them); and they are important precisely because they instruct us concerning the normal, the obvious, and the paradigmatic. The same goes for metaphysics, we submit. Although its major concern is, naturally, with such core entities as substances, properties, or hunks of solid matter, a lot may be learned by paying attention to those limit cases where we find ourselves dealing with entities of much lesser kinds, whether real or putative. (shrink)

The methodological anarchy that characterizes much recent research in artificial intelligence and other cognitive sciences has brought into existence (sometimes resumed) a large variety of entities from a correspondingly large variety of (sometimes dubious) ontological categories. Recent work in spatial representation and reasoning is particularly indicative of this trend. Our aim in this paper is to suggest some ways of reconciling such a luxurious proliferation of entities with the sheer sobriety of good philosophy.

The U.S. presidential election of 2000 was crucially decided in Florida. And, in Florida, the election hinged crucially on a peculiar sort of question: Does this ballot have a hole? “Yes, it does”, so the ballot is valid and ought to be counted. “No it doesn’t”, and the ballot must be discarded. If only one could tell! Where were the hole experts when we needed them? Eventually the matter was thwarted by the Supreme Court and we all gave up. But (...) we did learn something. We learned that even the destiny of a Presidential Election, if not more, might ultimately depend on one’s criteria for identifying holes—not their material surroundings, which everyone could detect, but the holes themselves. (shrink)

The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed (...) success. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThere is substantial evidence to suggest that deafness is associated with delays in emotion understanding, which has been attributed to delays in language acquisition and opportunities to converse. However, studies addressing the ability to recognise facial expressions of emotion have produced equivocal findings. The two experiments presented here attempt to clarify emotion recognition in deaf children by considering two aspects: the role of motion and the role of intensity in deaf children’s emotion recognition. In Study 1, 26 deaf children were (...) compared to 26 age-matched hearing controls on a computerised facial emotion recognition task involving static and dynamic expressions of 6 emotions. Eighteen of the deaf and 18 age-matched hearing controls additionally took part in Study 2, involving the presentation of the same 6 emotions at varying intensities. Study 1 showed that deaf children’s emotion recognition was better in the dynamic rather than static condition, whereas the hearing children sh... (shrink)

Frantz Fanon was a foundational figure in postcolonial and decolonial thought, yet his medical work has only been studied peripherally. With a focus on Fanon’s key psychiatry texts, Frantz Fanon: Psychiatry and Politics considers Fanon’s medical writings as materials anticipating as well as accompanying Fanon’s better known work.

A new type of impossible picture is presented and described. The picture involves an object along with its reflection in a plane mirror, delivering two apparently irreconcilable views of the object itself when seen simultaneously in its flesh and in the mirror. Contrary to other, more familiar impossible pictures, its interpretation requires explicit reasoning about the represented reality. It is a slow impossible picture.

Experimental studies have suggested that variables such as aptness or conventionality are predictors of people’s preference for expressing a particular topic–vehicle pair as either a metaphor or a simile. In the present study, we investigated if such variables would also be predictive within a more naturalistic context, where other variables, such as the intention to include an explanation, may also influence people’s decision. Specifically, we investigated the production of metaphor and simile expressions on the Internet via the Google search engine (...) and checked for accompanying explanations, as well as the properties they expressed, to examine whether ratings such as aptness, conventionality, as well as participants’ own stated preference or the intention to produce an explanation, would predict which topic–vehicle pairs appeared more often as metaphor. We found that participants’ stated preference predicted metaphor dominance on the Internet, and that apt topic–vehicles occurred more often as metaphors. The explanations collected, however, occurred 82% of the time after similes, and familiar expressions were the most explained. Finally, comparing the properties expressed in these explanations to normed property lists, we found that simile explanations typically expressed a novel conception of the topic–vehicle relationship. Therefore, we found that Internet posters use metaphors to convey an apt relationship, as found in previous laboratory studies, but prefer using a simile frame when they want to express a relationship that readers will find novel. (shrink)

To understand the number sense, we need to understand its function. We argue that numerosity estimation is fundamental not only for perception, but also preparation and control of action. We outline experiments that link numerosity estimation with action, pointing to a generalized numerosity system that serves both perception and action preparation.

Emotion-processing impairment represents a risk factor for the development of somatic illness, affecting negatively both health-related quality of life and disease management in several chronic diseases. The present pilot study aims at investigating the associations between alexithymia and depression, anxiety, and HRQoL in patients with Hashimoto’s thyroiditis ; examining the association between these three psychological conditions together with HRQoL, and thyroid autoantibodies status as well as thyroid echotexture in patients with HT; and comparing the intensity of all these clinical psychological (...) features in patients with HT versus controls. Twenty-one patients with serologically or ultrasonographically verified HT and 16 controls with non-toxic goiter or postsurgical hypothyroidism were recruited for this study. Serum thyrotropin and free thyroxine, as well as thyroid autoantibodies, were assayed. Alexithymia, depression, anxiety, and HRQoL were assessed with Toronto Alexithymia Scale; Beck Depression Inventory, second edition; Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale; and Health Survey Short-Form 36, respectively. A negative relationship between the difficulty to describe feelings and the cognitive component of depression was found. Besides, patients with seronegative HT had lower somatic anxiety than patients with HT who tested positive. Besides, no statistically significant difference was found between patients with HT and controls with regard to somatic anxiety. The present study suggests the relevance of alexithymia in patients suffering from HT, which may be intertwined with a possible state of underreported depression that is mainly expressed through physical complaints. Promoting the capability to describe and communicate feelings could contribute to psychological elaboration and coping with the disease and, consequently, to the improvement of self-management and perceived HRQoL. (shrink)

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

The current paper provides an overview of treatment noncompliance at various points in the treatment pathway, especially with respect to treatment for Pelvic-floor Dysfunction. The effects of noncompliance on healthcare are considered, and examples of supporting patients psychologically to increase compliance are discussed. An outline of a method to identify costs of non-compliance, and where such costs most intensely impact the healthcare system, is provided. It is suggested that psychological support is effective in terms of increased compliance and improved healthcare (...) economics. The model is presented for PFD, but the principles developed can be generalised to many aspects of healthcare. (shrink)

This white paper outlines the plans of the History Philosophy Culture Working Group of the Next Generation Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration.